Board of Peace for Gaza, Trump’s alternative to the UN

As discussions intensify over Gaza’s post-war governance, a U.S.-backed proposal for a Board of Peace for Gaza is moving from concept to structure, according to draft documents and officials familiar with the talks. The plan would bypass the United Nations and replace traditional multilateral decision-making with a smaller, executive-led model built around funding commitments and political leverage.

Presented publicly as a temporary mechanism to manage the transition from ceasefire to reconstruction, the Board is emerging as something more ambitious.

Governance without vetoes

Under current proposals, the Board would operate under an international mandate and be supported by a Palestinian technical committee of 15 members responsible for daily administration. That structure mirrors familiar post-conflict arrangements. The similarity largely ends there.

Unlike UN-led mechanisms, the Board would not be organised around equal state representation. Its core decision-making body would bring together political figures, senior envoys, financiers, and business leaders. Selection would be based on influence and capacity rather than formal representation.

Officials involved in the discussions describe the approach as deliberately streamlined. 

Fewer actors, fewer veto points and clear lines of authority. The objective, they argue, is to avoid the paralysis that has repeatedly undermined UN-led reconstruction efforts.

A deliberately hybrid composition

At the centre of the proposal is Donald Trump, positioned as chairman of the Board. Around him would sit a mix of U.S. political figures, former Western leaders, regional power brokers, and representatives from international finance and development institutions.

 A limited number of UN-affiliated figures are also expected to be included, lending a degree of institutional continuity without ceding control.

The composition reflects the logic of the project. Authority flows downward from a concentrated leadership rather than outward from a multilateral assembly. Diplomacy, finance, and executive power are deliberately fused.

A pay-to-join model 

The most consequential break with UN practice lies in how participation is structured. Under draft plans, states could engage with the Board on a temporary basis without mandatory financial contributions. 

Permanent membership, however, would require a substantial payment through a pay-to-join model. Figures circulating place the threshold at around one billion dollars.

Formally, the funds would be allocated to Gaza’s reconstruction and to the Board’s operating costs. Politically, the arrangement establishes a clear principle: influence is secured through financial commitment.

Supporters describe this as accountability. Those who pay have an incentive to ensure projects are delivered. Critics counter that it institutionalises inequality, privileging wealthy states and sidelining those without the capacity to buy their way into decision-making.

Clientelist capitalism on a global scale

The debate cuts to the heart of contemporary multilateralism. Proponents argue that the UN model – built on universal membership and consensus-driven decision-making – is ill-suited to urgent post-conflict environments. They point to years of stalled resolutions, diluted mandates, and underfunded reconstruction efforts.

The Board, by contrast, is designed for execution. Its defenders argue that effectiveness, not procedural purity, should be the benchmark.

Opponents see a different risk. By tying authority to capital, the Board formalises a transactional model of global governance. Multilateralism remains in name, but not in substance. Decisions are faster, but less representative. 

Outcomes may be delivered, but at the cost of legitimacy.

A prototype, not an exception

What gives the proposal its wider significance is its potential replicability. The Board is not conceived as a one-off response to Gaza. 

It offers a template: small coalitions, narrow mandates, direct funding and centralised leadership.

If adopted, it would sit alongside existing international institutions rather than replacing them outright. But its logic would inevitably weaken them, drawing resources and authority away from slower, more inclusive frameworks.

The unresolved question is whether the international system is willing to accept that trade-off. The Board of Peace for Gaza tests whether effectiveness can substitute for legitimacy in the exercise of global power. The answer will shape not only Gaza’s future, but the future of multilateral governance itself.

Image Credits: Montecruz foto via Wikimedia Commons