The future of the EU’s defence architecture: between partnerships and bold policy choices

In a period marked by a breakdown in the multipolar balance and a shift in the posture of transatlantic cooperation, the European Union finds itself at a crossroads. The choices it makes now will shape not only its security policy, but also the broader trajectory and autonomy of the European project.

Yet progress is often slowed by domestic political perceptions across Member States. A persistent misunderstanding continues to cloud strategic thinking: the belief that Europe is a collection of large and small powers, rather than a union whose strength depends on acting collectively. 

In reality, the EU is composed of smaller states, and some that have yet to recognise it.

Europe can only exert real influence if it acts with unity and speaks with a single voice. This requires institutional evolution. Moving towards a more federal approach, at least in foreign policy and defence, is essential. That logic underpins initiatives such as RearmEU and Readiness 2030, and will determine their effectiveness.

A more integrated and innovative security model

The reality on the ground points to the need for a holistic approach to security. The boundaries between civilian and military domains are increasingly blurred, particularly when it comes to dual-use technologies in sectors such as transport, energy and critical infrastructure.

European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius has set out a clear direction through programmes such as EDIP and SAFE. 

The focus is on better coordination among Member States in production capacity and economies of scale, stronger support for defence start-ups and SMEs, and a central strategic pillar: closer integration with Ukraine. After four years of war, Ukraine has emerged as a leader in military innovation.

A recent video message by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, marking the Day of Arms, illustrates this transformation. It presented 56 types of domestically developed systems, including 31 drones across multiple categories such as long-range, FPV, reconnaissance and interceptor models. The inventory also included missiles, electronic warfare systems, ground robotic units, unmanned naval platforms and specialised armoured vehicles. This breadth reflects a defence ecosystem that is adaptive, scalable and combat-tested.

Ukraine is increasingly seen as a key security partner beyond Europe. In recent months, it has attracted interest from Gulf countries and Asian partners, alongside its established cooperation with South Korea. For the EU, this creates a strategic opportunity.

A structured military partnership with Kyiv would not only strengthen Europe’s defence architecture but also allow European industry to absorb operational know-how and accelerate innovation through closer cooperation.

Military mobility and infrastructure gaps

Alongside industrial policy, the EU is also focusing on military mobility. The current system remains highly fragmented. Moving military equipment across Europe still requires dozens of national permits, which significantly delays response times. The concept of a “military Schengen” is gaining traction as a way to streamline procedures and ensure rapid deployment in crisis situations.

Infrastructure presents additional challenges. Railway gauge differences remain a practical obstacle to eastward mobility. Much of Eastern Europe uses the broader Soviet-era standard, which is incompatible with most EU networks. Addressing this gap would improve not only military logistics but also civilian transport and trade. 

What was once a strategic barrier between neighbours has become a structural weakness within an interconnected Union.

Hybrid threats and cyber resilience

Recent crises have also underlined the urgency of strengthening resilience against hybrid threats. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, as well as earlier cyber operations such as the 2007 attacks on Baltic states, have demonstrated the disruptive potential of non-conventional warfare. 

More recently, concerns have emerged in Estonia over disinformation campaigns linked to narratives around the border city of Narva, combined with reports of irregular activity near crossing points.

Cyber threats are expanding in scale and scope across the Union. Critical infrastructure, public institutions and cultural sites are increasingly targeted. Legislative efforts such as the Cyber Resilience Act mark important progress, but gaps remain in preparedness and coordination.

Taken together, three priorities stand out for the future of European defence. First, strengthening competitiveness and integration of the defence industry, with Ukraine as a central partner. Second, improving interoperability of systems and infrastructure, particularly through advances in military mobility. Third, reinforcing resilience in the cyber domain to better counter hybrid threats and external interference.