Omnibus I and the rightward turn that Brussels can’t ignore

The vote on Omnibus I may well mark a breaking point for the von der Leyen majority. On Thursday, the European Parliament approved the Commission’s flagship “simplification” package with a right-wing majority — a bloc composed of the EPP, Patriots for Europe and the ECR, reinforced by a handful of dissenters from S&D and Renew. 

It is a political first. Never before have EU co-legislators entered trilogue negotiations with a bill carried by what many call the “Venezuela majority”. The blame game around who is responsible for the “breakup” of the ruling coalition has already started, with EPP, Renew and S&D members pointing fingers at each other. (Think a Brussels’ remake of the Spider-Man pointing meme.)

But beneath the finger-pointing lies a quieter truth. All three groups have been politically weakened by this outcome, leaving the Von der Leyen coalition hanging by a thread. And for all the EPP’s flirtation with the right, a fully right-wing majority would be even more unstable than the one just damaged.

How did it come to this?

To understand Thursday’s showdown, let’s rewind to 13 October. 

That day, the JURI Committee approved a compromise text negotiated by the centrist groups to the satisfaction of rapporteur Jorgen Warborn, despite objections from MEP Wolters, who stepped down from her role as Shadow rapporteur. The centrist forces in the JURI committe also voted to launch trilogues without sending the file to plenary first.

What seemed like a tidy, disciplined negotiation quickly became fertile ground for betrayals and plot twists. Opposition groups challenged the fast-track decision and triggered a secret ballot — a move that opened the door to the unexpected. 

Around 30 S&D MEPs, frustrated with the EPP’s constant drift between left and right, broke ranks. Some EPP members (reportedly from the Polish and Italian delegations) did the same. The compromise collapsed, and the file was catapulted into an unavoidable plenary vote. 

Fast forward to this Thursday, and the consequences were laid bare. The EPP completed its rightward turn, delivering Omnibus I with a majority anchored by the far right.

The blame game

The first to break cover was Renew’s Pascal Canfin, who on Wednesday announced the failure of the negotiations and warned that a right-wing majority was now inevitable. His message was clear: it was the S&D MEPs who “played with fire” by torpedoing the deal back in October. Renew’s leader, Valérie Hayer, took a different aim. She fired shots at the EPP, whom she accused of willingly marching “hand in hand” with sovereigntists and anti-EU groups.

Warborn pointed the finger at S&D and the Greens, insisting he had tried “everything possible” to keep the majority intact, but the effort was not reciprocated. Weber and Metsola had been very clear on the need to approve the file, doing “whatever it takes” (sorry Prof. Draghi, I know you would not love this). Whether that determination was matched by genuine compromise remains an open question.

On the other side, the Greens and S&D place full responsibility on the EPP, accusing them of strong-arming the process, abusing their institutional leverage, and repeatedly threatening to break the cordon sanitaire whenever their demands were not met.

Regardless of whose narrative one believes, one thing is clear: every group carries some responsibility for a mess that now seriously threatens the coalition’s stability.

What’s next?

Warborn’s tone at Thursday’s press conference was notably untroubled. He insisted that the von der Leyen majority remains the institutional “status quo”, though he also made clear that the EPP does not consider itself bound to it if other paths deliver results. 

Pragmatism is a priority for the EPP. Yet the question now hanging over Brussels is whether this pragmatism is shading into opportunism. And, more fundamentally, whether it is possible to overlook the fact that the EPP voted in full alignment with the extreme right.

For S&D and the Greens, the moment could prove to be a genuine turning point. Both groups must now decide whether to continue supporting a coalition they believe has shifted beneath them or whether the Omnibus vote has crossed a line that cannot be uncrossed. 

The first major test could come as early as next week, when the S&Ds and the Greens may consider joining forces with The Left to oppose the delegated act simplifying the EU Taxonomy Regulation. Such a move would widen an already visible rift over sustainability policy and signal that the post-election “grand coalition” remains anything but stable.

While options for compromise technically exist, a majority of actors privately admit that the overriding priority is preserving the current configuration of the European Commission. The likeliest scenario, according to several officials, is a quiet non-aggression pact: a tacit commitment by the major groups to resume functional cooperation while avoiding open confrontation.

A reshuffle no one wants

For S&D and the Greens, the coming days may prove decisive. The groups must choose whether to swallow what many view as a bitter pill by tolerating a Commission and legislative agenda that continues to drift rightward, or whether to conclude that it is already too late to return to the pre-election equilibrium. Working with the Left to oppose the delegated act simplifying Taxonomy, would be an unmistakable signal that they have opted for confrontation.

Despite rising tensions, a formal reshuffling of the Commission appears unattractive for all sides.

Left-wing parties risk losing their positions within the Commission after already seeing their influence decline in both Parliament and the Council, where the EPP now holds near-hegemonic sway. Far-right parties could lose momentum (and potentially votes) by entering a governing arrangement, as often happens once groups become incumbents. The EPP might gain short-term advantages from a new coalition but would likely forfeit its centrist voters without securing meaningful support on its right. An all-right alliance would also be highly unstable. 

As for Ursula von der Leyen, the figurehead of the Green Deal remains unpopular among right-leaning groups, making it difficult to imagine her leading an EPP–PfE–ECR Commission.