Russia’s Evolving Strategy: From Hybrid Pressure to Battlefield Adaptation

The crisis front increasingly confronting Europe, involving with growing concern and systematic intensity the continent’s skies, critical infrastructure and social cohesion, is the one represented by so-called hybrid warfare. Far from being an abstract concept, hybrid warfare has become a collection of concrete actions, carefully calibrated to exploit vulnerabilities and disrupt everyday life. The vulnerability of European airspace has been highlighted by drone incursions and unidentified objects near airport infrastructure, as seen in Leipzig and Vilnius, aimed not only at testing radar systems but also at physically disrupting transport corridors.

Disrupting Europe’s Defence and Energy Networks

At the same time, Europe’s defence sector is under constant pressure. Fires and explosions at ammunition and military-component factories, from Italy to Bulgaria, not least the sinking of two cargo ships in Sofia’s exclusive economic zone, are aimed at slowing the supply chains supporting Ukraine while placing additional pressure on Europe’s response capacity and critical infrastructure. Satellite sovereignty is also becoming a target, as illustrated by the fire at a Starlink ground station in Poland, suggesting that the objective is to disrupt the civilian and military networks that are increasingly essential to the coordination of allied forces. Energy security remains another permanent target, as demonstrated by attacks near extraction facilities in the Black Sea and the growing need to fortify critical energy infrastructure, including along Poland’s Suwałki corridor.

Information Warfare as a Tool of Intimidation

Hybrid warfare also seeks to fragment and undermine cohesion within European states through disinformation, the exploitation of organised crime and interference in democratic life. One of the most recent examples came from Lithuania, where the Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published, and then rapidly deleted, an article by Alexander Nosovich speculating about a potential lightning invasion of Lithuania, entitled “Russia Faces Another Special Military Operation. It Will Be Very Short.” The episode fits into a broader pattern of probing operations designed to test an adversary’s reactions, exploit existing fears and assess the political and psychological effects of threatening narratives.

Disinformation and the Erosion of European Unity

The seriousness of the situation within Europe’s information environment is further illustrated by the EU’s decision to sanction Xenia Fedorova, a prominent figure in the Russian media ecosystem and former head of Russia Today France, for her role in Russia’s hybrid activities, particularly foreign information manipulation and interference. The systematic activity of organisations such as Russia Today, alongside coordinated networks of social-media accounts and influencers, seeks to disseminate and amplify propaganda and disinformation reportedly developed by specialised FSB units. The objective is not necessarily to convince European publics of a single alternative narrative, but to confuse, polarise and contaminate the public debate. The strategic effect Moscow seeks to generate is to push electorates towards anti-European positions, fragmenting political cohesion from within and weakening the EU’s ability to act collectively.

Pressure on Europe’s Eastern Borders

These narratives and operations form part of a broader and increasingly intensified strategy by Moscow and Minsk, whose pressure along Europe’s borders has become more frequent and aggressive. Recent incidents on the Baltic borders provide an important indication of the level of ambition and operational initiative Russia and Belarus are prepared to deploy against the Baltic states. On 6 October in Latvia, armed individuals on the Belarusian side reportedly escorted a group of around 20 migrants towards Latvian territory and threatened Latvian border guards, according to Interior Minister Janis Dombrava. Hours later, a group of masked individuals illegally crossed the border, damaging a distribution cabinet and stealing cameras before border guards arrived. Dombrava warned Minsk that similar incidents could have “serious consequences”, recalling the EU’s sanctions against Belarus in 2021 over the instrumentalisation of migrants.

Testing NATO’s Deterrence on the Eastern Flank

This came on top of the much more serious incident of 15 September, when NATO aircraft had to shoot down a drone originating from Belarus after it violated Lithuanian airspace, flying over Lentvaris near Vilnius before being intercepted and destroyed near Kaunas, according to Vilmantas Vitkauskas, head of Lithuania’s National Crisis Management Centre. Such actions are useful to Moscow regardless of its immediate intentions or the timing of any potential military operation. Beyond helping to create a narrative that could later be used to legitimise aggression, they contribute to a perception of imminent war. From the Russian perspective, this can itself become a strategic asset if sustained pressure begins to undermine public confidence in NATO among European and Baltic populations, creating doubts about whether the Alliance is capable of providing adequate protection through its current strategy of containment and deterrence along the eastern flank.

Russia’s Drone Arsenal Evolves

Yet the hybrid campaign against Europe cannot be separated from what is happening on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russia is simultaneously attempting to develop new ways of increasing the lethality, reach and resilience of its strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian targets. The evolution of the Geran family provides a particularly clear illustration of this adaptation. Since the introduction of the Geran-2 in 2022, Moscow has progressively modified the platform, introducing simplified composite materials, more resistant navigation systems, mesh-network capabilities and, eventually, jet propulsion. The new Geran-4 and Geran-5, however, appear to mark a more significant shift. Russia may now have concluded that the operational advantages of greater speed outweigh the industrial benefits of maintaining complete continuity with the original airframe.

Outpacing Ukraine’s Air Defences

The central objective appears to be to outrun Ukraine’s increasingly layered counter-UAV architecture. Ukrainian forces have expanded their use of interceptor drones alongside fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and conventional air-defence systems, creating an increasingly demanding environment for slower Russian one-way attack drones. The reported top speeds of up to 500–600 km/h for the new Geran variants would allow them to outrun many existing counter-UAV platforms and complicate interception by anti-aircraft systems. Russia is therefore not simply increasing the number of drones it launches. It is attempting to change the technological and economic equation of interception, forcing Ukraine to deploy increasingly sophisticated, and therefore more expensive, means against comparatively low-cost Russian strike platforms. Their potential ability to operate at higher altitudes reinforces this logic by creating an additional requirement for more capable interceptors.

From Strike Weapons to a Wider Air-War Architecture

At the same time, Moscow appears to be expanding the role of the drone beyond the traditional one-way strike mission. The reported possibility of launching Geran-4 and Geran-5 variants from Su-25 aircraft would give Russia additional flexibility in how and where these systems are employed, while potentially assigning a secondary role to an aircraft whose effectiveness in close-air-support missions has been constrained by Ukraine’s contested airspace. Even more significant is the reported integration of air-to-air missiles and mesh-network datalinks. This points towards an attempt to turn some Gerans into systems capable of engaging Ukrainian aircraft involved in counter-UAV operations. Russia is therefore beginning to treat the drone not merely as ammunition to be expended against ground targets, but as a flexible node within a broader air-war architecture.

The Economics of Russia’s Drone Warfare

The evolution of the Geran also reflects a wider Russian attempt to adapt its strike arsenal to a new technological and economic environment. Rather than relying exclusively on increasingly sophisticated and expensive cruise missiles, Moscow appears to be moving towards low-cost, cruise-missile-like systems derived from simpler platforms. These weapons sacrifice some of the performance and survivability of advanced cruise missiles in exchange for lower unit costs, rapid production and shorter development cycles. The Geran-5 is therefore more than simply another drone variant. It points towards a strategy that combines mass production with incremental technological adaptation, allowing Russia to retain the advantages of scale while progressively making its strike systems faster, harder to intercept and more versatile.

One Strategy, Multiple Fronts

Taken together, these developments suggest that Russia’s strategy is becoming increasingly centred on the systematic exploitation of vulnerabilities rather than on a single form of military pressure. Hybrid operations test the resilience of European societies, infrastructure and institutions; pressure along the eastern borders tests NATO’s political cohesion and deterrence posture; and technological adaptation on the Ukrainian battlefield seeks to overcome the growing effectiveness of Ukrainian defences. The common denominator is the search for asymmetry: Moscow is attempting to force its adversaries to spend more, react faster and devote increasingly sophisticated resources to counter comparatively inexpensive and flexible Russian capabilities.

Military Escalation Over Negotiated Compromise

This combination of hybrid pressure and battlefield adaptation also provides an important indication of Moscow’s political calculations. The simultaneous intensification of hybrid operations across Europe and of Russia’s attempts to strike Ukraine in ways that are increasingly difficult and costly to defend against points once again to the considerable distance between the Kremlin and any genuine willingness to sit at the negotiating table with Volodymyr Zelensky. Russia, or more precisely its political-military elite, still appears convinced that its best chance of preserving the regime’s strategic position lies in the continued and more forceful application of military power. Rather than preparing for compromise, Moscow appears to be adapting its methods in order to make the use of force more sustainable, more difficult to counter and more politically disruptive for its opponents. The result is a strategy in which the battlefield in Ukraine and the wider European security environment are no longer separate theatres, but increasingly interconnected components of the same confrontation.