Europe at a crossroads: Why decision-making reform can no longer wait

Europe was never built for speed. Its institutions were designed to reconcile interests, absorb differences and produce consensus among sovereign states. That model has long been a source of resilience. But in a geopolitical environment defined by rapid escalation, economic shocks and strategic competition, it is increasingly becoming a constraint.

Today, the European Union faces a convergence of pressures that are testing not only its policies, but the way it takes decisions.

A narrow window for action

After months of acute tension in the Middle East, there are tentative signs of de-escalation. Not a settlement, but a pause and a degree of political space. For the EU, such moments are rare and often short-lived.

Internally, another shift is just as significant. Hungary’s repeated use of veto power has, at least temporarily, receded from the centre of EU foreign policy blockages. In recent years, Budapest has delayed or diluted sanctions packages, statements on Ukraine, and broader geopolitical positioning. 

Even a partial easing of that dynamic creates an opening for more coherent European action. The question is whether the EU can use that window effectively.

Hormuz as a geopolitical test case

One immediate test lies far from Brussels: the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly a fifth of global oil consumption passes through this narrow corridor, making it one of the world’s most critical chokepoints.

Any disruption has near-instant consequences for energy prices, inflation and industrial output in Europe.

The EU has experience in this domain. Its maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH), launched in 2020 and led by several member states, was designed to ensure safe navigation without escalating military tensions. But the current situation may require a more ambitious approach.

A European-led initiative focused on demining, maritime security and freedom of navigation would serve multiple purposes. It would protect core economic interests, reduce dependency on external security guarantees, and demonstrate that the EU can act as a security provider.

Such a mission would not replace NATO or compete with the United States. But it would signal a shift toward greater strategic autonomy in practice.

Rethinking reliance on Washington

The transatlantic relationship remains central to European security. NATO continues to underpin collective defence, particularly in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Yet the political context in Washington is shifting.

Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has revived longstanding concerns about the reliability of US commitments. During his previous term, he repeatedly questioned NATO’s value, threatened to condition defence guarantees, and took unilateral decisions on trade and foreign policy that caught European allies off guard.

Even if institutional ties endure, the assumption of automatic alignment is no longer tenable.

For Europe, this does not mean decoupling. It means recalibrating. Maintaining close cooperation while investing more in its own capabilities is increasingly seen as a necessity rather than a choice.

Economic pressure is building

Geopolitical instability is already feeding into economic risk. Energy markets remain sensitive to developments in the Gulf. Supply chain disruptions continue to affect key sectors.

Institutions including the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank have warned that prolonged geopolitical fragmentation could weigh on growth, dampen investment and exacerbate inequality.

For European households, this translates into a tangible squeeze on living standards. For governments, it limits fiscal space at a time when demands for defence, industrial policy and social protection are all rising.

The case for another collective leap

The EU has responded to systemic crises before. During the Covid-19 pandemic, it broke long-standing taboos by jointly issuing debt to finance the €750 billion Next Generation EU recovery fund. 

That move marked a significant step toward fiscal integration, even if framed as temporary.

A growing number of policymakers and economists argue that a similar approach may now be required. Proposals include new joint borrowing to finance defence and energy infrastructure, a more flexible application of fiscal rules, and an expanded role for the European Investment Bank in de-risking strategic investments.

At the same time, support for Ukraine remains a central pillar of EU policy, adding to the urgency of ensuring adequate funding mechanisms.

The structural constraint: unanimity

All of these ambitions run into the same institutional barrier: unanimity.

In key areas such as foreign policy and taxation, every member state retains a veto. This was intended as a safeguard of sovereignty. In practice, it has increasingly become a source of paralysis.

Over the past decade, unanimity has delayed sanctions, weakened diplomatic positions and, at times, allowed individual governments to extract concessions unrelated to the issue at hand. As the EU expands and its agenda becomes more complex, the costs of this system are rising.

There are existing mechanisms to move beyond it. The treaties allow for “qualified majority voting” in certain areas, and so-called passerelle clauses could extend this further without full treaty change. 

But using them requires political will — and, paradoxically, often unanimity to activate.

Europe now faces a clear choice. It can preserve its current decision-making model and accept the limits that come with it. Or it can adapt to become a political actor capable of acting when it matters.