The real story is not whether the leader of the Rassemblement National could end up campaigning with an electronic ankle monitor. It is that France is heading towards the 2027 presidential election with the far right closer to the Élysée Palace than at any point in the Fifth Republic.

It would be a mistake to view this solely through the lens of the courts. Judicial rulings establish individual responsibility; they rarely settle political debates. If anything, they often reinforce the narrative of persecution on which populist movements thrive.

Marine Le Pen understands that better than anyone.

That helps explain why she insists she remains a presidential candidate. Winning the Élysée is only part of the calculation. Stepping aside would also mean surrendering control of the Rassemblement National to Jordan Bardella, the party’s 30-year-old president and the politician many now see as the future face of Europe’s nationalist right.

And that is where the real political story begins.

The Bardella factor

Unlike Le Pen, Bardella has worked carefully to make himself acceptable to a broader conservative electorate.

He has cultivated the image of a pragmatic nationalist rather than a political firebrand, positioning himself closer to the language of Europe’s mainstream conservative parties than to the confrontational style traditionally associated with the French far right.

Young, media-savvy and disciplined, Bardella has also proved capable of engaging with business leaders and moderate voters who once viewed the National Front as politically untouchable.

That is no small transformation.

For the first time, the French far right is no longer simply trying to channel protest. It is positioning itself to govern.

Le Pen’s proposed ticket—with herself as president and Bardella as prime minister—is designed to broaden the far right’s electoral coalition. It combines the enduring strength of the Le Pen name, which continues to mobilise the party’s core electorate, with Bardella’s growing appeal among conservative voters who have so far kept the French far right from clearing its final electoral hurdle.

Leaving Europe is no longer the strategy

The European far right has evolved.

The objective is no longer to leave the European Union. That political chapter has largely closed.

Today’s strategy is more sophisticated. Remain inside the institutions while gradually reducing their political weight, shifting power back to national capitals and slowing, or reversing, further European integration.

It is an approach Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has pursued for years.

It is also the political direction of the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament, where Bardella has emerged as one of the alliance’s leading figures.

The goal is no longer to dismantle the European Union from the outside. It is to redefine it from within.

The question Europe should really be asking

For pro-European parties, the more pressing challenge is understanding why nationalist movements continue to resonate with millions of voters. At a time when global power is increasingly concentrated in continental-scale actors such as the United States, China and India, calls to reclaim national sovereignty continue to gain traction across Europe.

Simply warning about the dangers of populism will not reverse that trend.

Europe must instead demonstrate that integration delivers tangible results: stronger economic growth, greater security, effective management of migration, technological leadership, energy independence, a credible European defence and rising living standards.

Unless citizens see that European cooperation improves their everyday lives, the political space for those offering simple answers to complex problems is unlikely to shrink.

More than a French election

The stakes extend far beyond Paris.

France is a founding member of the European Union, its second-largest economy, its only nuclear power after Brexit and a central actor in European defence, foreign policy and economic governance. A far-right victory at the Élysée would inevitably reshape the balance of power across the Union.

The 2027 presidential election therefore has the potential to become Europe’s most consequential political test since the Brexit referendum. Its significance reaches well beyond Marine Le Pen or the outcome of a single national contest. The campaign will reveal whether the European project still commands public confidence at a time of mounting geopolitical rivalry and economic uncertainty.

Across the continent, governments and investors will be watching closely because the consequences will extend far beyond France’s borders. The direction of European integration, the cohesion of the Franco-German partnership and the Union’s capacity to act collectively could all be influenced by the result.

This election will ultimately test the political appeal of competing visions for Europe’s future: one centred on deeper cooperation, the other on a stronger return to national sovereignty.

L'articolo France’s election is becoming Europe’s biggest political test proviene da The Watcher Post.

Yet every technological revolution eventually produces the same political question: who benefits?

That debate has been thrust back into the spotlight by Bernie Sanders, the independent US senator from Vermont and one of America’s most influential progressive voices. A former Democratic presidential candidate, Sanders has argued that while AI has the potential to generate enormous economic gains, those benefits should not accrue solely to the technology companies building the models.

His intervention comes as governments across the world scramble to regulate artificial intelligence while remaining competitive in an increasingly intense technological race dominated by the United States and China.

Private investment built AI, but not alone

Few would dispute the central role played by companies such as OpenAI, Microsoft, Google, Anthropic and Meta.

Collectively, they have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in computing infrastructure, recruited many of the world’s leading researchers and accelerated breakthroughs that only a decade ago appeared distant.

Private capital has driven the current wave of innovation.

But Sanders argues that this is only part of the story.

Artificial intelligence systems are trained on an extraordinary body of human knowledge: scientific literature, books, journalism, public research, software, music, art and decades of digital information produced across society. Much of the underlying research that enabled today’s AI revolution—from early machine learning to semiconductor development and the internet itself—also benefited from decades of publicly funded scientific investment.

In other words, today’s AI boom rests on both private entrepreneurship and a vast collective inheritance.

That distinction matters because it shapes a larger political question: if the foundations of AI are partly public, should some of the wealth it creates also flow back to the public?

A new era of concentrated wealth?

Sanders’ warning extends beyond technology itself.

Artificial intelligence could become the largest productivity shock since the Industrial Revolution, boosting output across sectors from healthcare and manufacturing to finance and professional services.

Yet the economic gains may not be distributed evenly.

The companies developing frontier AI models already command enormous market valuations, control vast computing infrastructure and possess datasets that few competitors can match. Economists have increasingly warned that AI could reinforce existing market concentration, widening the gap between highly productive firms and the rest of the economy.

The concern is not simply that some companies will become richer. It is that AI could accelerate the concentration of economic power, data and political influence in the hands of a small number of firms.

The case for an AI dividend

To address that possibility, Sanders has pointed to models such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, which distributes annual payments to residents from oil revenues, and Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, which invests resource wealth for future generations.

His suggestion is not a fully developed legislative proposal but a broader principle: if AI generates extraordinary new wealth, governments should consider mechanisms that ensure society shares in those returns.

That could mean direct payments to citizens, greater investment in education and healthcare, expanded research funding or stronger social protection for workers displaced by automation.

Whether policymakers ultimately choose one model or another, Sanders is attempting to shift the conversation from regulating AI’s risks to governing its economic rewards.

Innovation still needs room to grow

Critics argue that excessive taxation or redistribution could undermine innovation at precisely the moment Western economies are racing to compete with China.

Developing frontier AI requires unprecedented investment in chips, energy infrastructure, data centres and highly specialised talent. Governments therefore face a delicate balancing act: encouraging innovation while ensuring that its benefits are broadly shared.

The debate is not simply between regulation and growth. It is about designing institutions capable of supporting both.

That includes lifelong learning, large-scale workforce retraining, stronger competition policy, updated intellectual property frameworks and international tax rules that reflect increasingly digital business models.

Europe’s opportunity

For Europe, the discussion carries particular significance.

Unlike the United States, the EU has relatively few global AI champions. Its influence instead lies in shaping the regulatory and governance framework surrounding emerging technologies.

Having already established itself as a global standard-setter through the AI Act, Brussels is well placed to broaden the conversation beyond safety and transparency towards questions of economic distribution, competition and public investment.

The challenge will be to encourage innovation without allowing the value generated by AI to become concentrated among a handful of firms while the wider public bears the costs of economic disruption.

The next political battle over AI

History suggests that technological revolutions rarely reshape economies alone. They also reshape politics.

The Industrial Revolution produced labour protections. Electrification transformed public infrastructure. The digital revolution forced governments to rethink privacy, taxation and competition.

Artificial intelligence is likely to do the same.

Whether governments ultimately embrace an AI dividend or reject the idea entirely, Sanders has succeeded in placing a fundamental question on the political agenda: who should benefit from one of the greatest technological transformations in modern history?

The future of artificial intelligence will be determined not only by advances in algorithms or computing power, but by the political choices societies make about how the wealth it generates is distributed.

As AI accelerates, the debate is shifting from what the technology can do to who it ultimately serves. That may prove to be the defining political question of the AI era.

L'articolo Bernie Sanders wants an AI dividend proviene da The Watcher Post.

It offered a clear-eyed view that a long historical phase of the EU has come to an end, and with it a roadmap for what must come next.

For more than seventy years, Europe has been able to build peace, a single market, a common currency and freedom of movement because it operated within a stable international order, underpinned by US security guarantees and sustained by globalisation. 

In that environment, the EU prioritised rules, compromise and governance, reducing the role of power politics that had devastated the continent in the twentieth century. That world no longer exists.

The pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the energy crisis, geopolitical tensions, technological competition and the artificial intelligence revolution have exposed Europe’s vulnerabilities: energy dependence, technological delays, industrial fragmentation, insufficient capital integration and an inability to invest at the necessary scale.

The core message of Draghi is simple but decisive. 

Europe can no longer function as a large regulated market alone. It must become a genuine political, industrial, technological and strategic power.

The challenge posed by AI, energy infrastructure, semiconductors, common defence and technological sovereignty requires massive investment, European coordination and the ability to make decisions quickly. 

In a world dominated by large continental powers, no European country can manage this alone.

For this reason, Draghi speaks of “pragmatic federalism” – groups of Member States willing to move forward together on defence, energy, innovation and common security. 

Not against the United States, but to finally build a mature Europe capable of being a strong ally rather than a dependent one.

The war in Ukraine has already changed Europe more deeply than is often acknowledged. It has forced Europeans to recognise that freedom, democracy and prosperity cannot survive without strategic capacity, industrial autonomy and common defence.

Aachen, therefore, was far more than a ceremonial lecture. It was a call for Europe’s historical maturity.

And at such a difficult and decisive moment, a figure like Draghi would likely remain one of the most authoritative guarantees for guiding the Union towards a transformation that can no longer be postponed.

L'articolo Why the EU still needs Draghi proviene da The Watcher Post.

Today, the European Union faces a convergence of pressures that are testing not only its policies, but the way it takes decisions.

A narrow window for action

After months of acute tension in the Middle East, there are tentative signs of de-escalation. Not a settlement, but a pause and a degree of political space. For the EU, such moments are rare and often short-lived.

Internally, another shift is just as significant. Hungary’s repeated use of veto power has, at least temporarily, receded from the centre of EU foreign policy blockages. In recent years, Budapest has delayed or diluted sanctions packages, statements on Ukraine, and broader geopolitical positioning. 

Even a partial easing of that dynamic creates an opening for more coherent European action. The question is whether the EU can use that window effectively.

Hormuz as a geopolitical test case

One immediate test lies far from Brussels: the Strait of Hormuz. Roughly a fifth of global oil consumption passes through this narrow corridor, making it one of the world’s most critical chokepoints.

Any disruption has near-instant consequences for energy prices, inflation and industrial output in Europe.

The EU has experience in this domain. Its maritime surveillance mission in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH), launched in 2020 and led by several member states, was designed to ensure safe navigation without escalating military tensions. But the current situation may require a more ambitious approach.

A European-led initiative focused on demining, maritime security and freedom of navigation would serve multiple purposes. It would protect core economic interests, reduce dependency on external security guarantees, and demonstrate that the EU can act as a security provider.

Such a mission would not replace NATO or compete with the United States. But it would signal a shift toward greater strategic autonomy in practice.

Rethinking reliance on Washington

The transatlantic relationship remains central to European security. NATO continues to underpin collective defence, particularly in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Yet the political context in Washington is shifting.

Donald Trump’s return to the presidency has revived longstanding concerns about the reliability of US commitments. During his previous term, he repeatedly questioned NATO’s value, threatened to condition defence guarantees, and took unilateral decisions on trade and foreign policy that caught European allies off guard.

Even if institutional ties endure, the assumption of automatic alignment is no longer tenable.

For Europe, this does not mean decoupling. It means recalibrating. Maintaining close cooperation while investing more in its own capabilities is increasingly seen as a necessity rather than a choice.

Economic pressure is building

Geopolitical instability is already feeding into economic risk. Energy markets remain sensitive to developments in the Gulf. Supply chain disruptions continue to affect key sectors.

Institutions including the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank have warned that prolonged geopolitical fragmentation could weigh on growth, dampen investment and exacerbate inequality.

For European households, this translates into a tangible squeeze on living standards. For governments, it limits fiscal space at a time when demands for defence, industrial policy and social protection are all rising.

The case for another collective leap

The EU has responded to systemic crises before. During the Covid-19 pandemic, it broke long-standing taboos by jointly issuing debt to finance the €750 billion Next Generation EU recovery fund. 

That move marked a significant step toward fiscal integration, even if framed as temporary.

A growing number of policymakers and economists argue that a similar approach may now be required. Proposals include new joint borrowing to finance defence and energy infrastructure, a more flexible application of fiscal rules, and an expanded role for the European Investment Bank in de-risking strategic investments.

At the same time, support for Ukraine remains a central pillar of EU policy, adding to the urgency of ensuring adequate funding mechanisms.

The structural constraint: unanimity

All of these ambitions run into the same institutional barrier: unanimity.

In key areas such as foreign policy and taxation, every member state retains a veto. This was intended as a safeguard of sovereignty. In practice, it has increasingly become a source of paralysis.

Over the past decade, unanimity has delayed sanctions, weakened diplomatic positions and, at times, allowed individual governments to extract concessions unrelated to the issue at hand. As the EU expands and its agenda becomes more complex, the costs of this system are rising.

There are existing mechanisms to move beyond it. The treaties allow for “qualified majority voting” in certain areas, and so-called passerelle clauses could extend this further without full treaty change. 

But using them requires political will — and, paradoxically, often unanimity to activate.

Europe now faces a clear choice. It can preserve its current decision-making model and accept the limits that come with it. Or it can adapt to become a political actor capable of acting when it matters.

L'articolo Europe at a crossroads: Why decision-making reform can no longer wait proviene da The Watcher Post.

A Trojan horse inside the EU

In this context, Hungary risks becoming a Trojan horse within the Union. It is a country that benefits from EU membership while systematically using its veto power to block key decisions: from foreign to security and energy policy.
The outcome is an EU perceived as ineffective, distant and unable to protect its citizens.
This is not accidental. It aligns with the strategic objective of those seeking to reshape global power balances: weaken the European project from within, strip it of credibility and cohesion, and render it irrelevant on the international stage.
In that scenario, other external actors — from the US to China and Russia — are dividing spheres of influence while Europe hesitates.

Not an episodic crisis

Treating this as a one-off dynamic would be a mistake. What Europe faces is structural pressure, and it requires a structural response.
Appeals to values or infringement procedures are no longer enough. What is needed is a political leap.
The EU must find the courage to reform itself. 
That means addressing mechanisms of paralysis, starting with the abuse of veto powers, and strengthening decision-making capacity in foreign and security policy.
Above all, Europe must reconnect with its citizens, showing that unity and integration are not slogans but practical tools for protection and growth.

A test for Europe

Hungary’s election is a test case. Not only for Budapest, but for the entire Union.
Defending the EU today also means preventing it from being hollowed out from within, state by state.

L'articolo Hungary’s election: a vote that will test all of Europe proviene da The Watcher Post.

The signal moment came in late January, when Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni met Chancellor Friedrich Merz and signed a cooperation agreement on defense and security. 

The substance of the deal matters less than what it represents: a deliberate effort to elevate a traditionally commercial partnership into a strategic one, at a time when Europe’s old assumptions about security, trade and power are rapidly eroding.

From interdependence to ambition

Italy and Germany have always been economically entwined. Germany is Italy’s largest trading partner; their industries are stitched together across automotive, machinery, chemicals and advanced manufacturing. 

What is new is not the scale of exchange, but the ambition behind it. Rome and Berlin are no longer content to coexist within the single market. They are probing whether a bilateral axis can shape decisions in Brussels on security, industrial policy and Europe’s place in the world.

The defense agreement is the clearest expression of that ambition. Framed around closer strategic coordination, NATO cooperation and support for a stronger European defense pillar, it reflects a shared diagnosis that Europe can no longer outsource its own security. The language of “joint responses” and “autonomous capacity” is carefully calibrated. Neither government is challenging the Atlantic alliance. Both are signaling that the EU must become a more credible strategic actor within it.

Whether that signal translates into reality is another question. Joint procurement, shared industrial programs and large-scale defense investment have long foundered on national interests and bureaucratic inertia. Without concrete follow-through, the agreement risks becoming another declaration of intent in a crowded European archive.

Competitiveness, with caveats

The same tension runs through the economic dimension of the renewed partnership. At a business forum held alongside the summit, officials from both countries emphasized competitiveness, energy costs and the need for a more assertive European industrial policy. Rome and Berlin share a growing frustration with what they see as a regulatory culture in Brussels that constrains manufacturing just as global competition from the U.S. and China intensifies.

Here, the Italian-German convergence points toward a broader political challenge. Both governments are pushing for a Europe that does more than regulate markets, one that actively supports production, innovation and strategic value chains. Yet the asymmetry between them remains unavoidable. 

Germany’s economic weight gives it far greater agenda-setting power, raising the risk that “coordination” becomes shorthand for Berlin’s preferences, with Italy playing catch-up rather than co-author.

The promise and problem of alignment 

There is also a more symbolic and cultural dimension, often invoked in public debate. Italy and Germany are frequently portrayed as countries united by a long history of intellectual and political interaction, a bond that should today translate into a shared responsibility for the European project. This narrative, while evocative, tends to gloss over the real divergences that continue to surface on crucial issues such as economic governance, fiscal flexibility and the role of the state in the economy.

Taken together, the renewed Italian-German activism is best understood as an attempt to reshape the internal balance of the European Union during a period of transition. Faced with geopolitical fragmentation and economic pressure, Rome and Berlin are testing whether closer alignment can compensate for a more divided Europe.

The risk is that this axis remains inward-looking, a tactical convergence of national interests rather than a driver of deeper integration.

If Italy and Germany are to succeed, they could help push Europe toward greater strategic coherence. If they fail, their rapprochement will look less like a new foundation for the Union and more like a temporary response to a moment of crisis. At a time when Europe’s margins for error are narrowing, the distinction matters.

L'articolo Italy and Germany are rewriting the balance of power in Europe proviene da The Watcher Post.

The European Union now faces the imperative of rethinking its role and its capacity for autonomous action. Against this backdrop, one question returns with growing insistence: Quo vadis, Europa?

The Union is entering a decisive phase in which both its political destiny and strategic identity are being tested on the Ukrainian and Middle Eastern fronts. A common thread connects these two crises: the EU possesses the instruments to act, yet continues to struggle to turn them into real political power.

In both cases, Brussels has deployed a vast array of diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian tools. These efforts show how far European integration has come.

Still, this wealth of tools has not led to a clear political course as Europe’s diplomacy remains cautious and fragmented.

A turning point for European integration
In a matter of months, the Union adopted measures that would have seemed unthinkable not long ago: vast packages of financial and military aid, sweeping sanctions against the Russian Federation, use of the European Peace Facility to support Ukraine’s defence, and even the first steps toward a common defence policy.

This toolkit demonstrates the Union’s capacity to mobilise in the face of an existential threat. But it also exposes the limits of an institutional framework still constrained by intergovernmental mechanisms.
Every strategic decision in Europe remains the delicate outcome of a balance among twenty-seven, often divergent, national interests.

At the 23 October Council meeting, Member States faced a major test of the EU’s credibility. The most sensitive being the question of using frozen Russian assets to finance Kyiv. Belgium, where most of these assets are held, warned of serious financial and legal risks linked to possible Russian retaliation.

Prime Minister Bart De Wever ultimately negotiated a postponement of the decision until the next Council meeting.

Some progress was made on sanctions. EU leaders adopted a nineteenth package after Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico withdrew his veto. The new measures will ban Russian LNG imports by the end of 2026 and tighten controls on Moscow’s “shadow fleet” of tankers used to evade Western restrictions.

Member States also agreed on a Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030 – a plan to coordinate Europe’s rearmament through the end of the decade.

The paradox is a global economic powerhouse that still struggles to convert that strength into political capital. Its voice, while authoritative, is not yet decisive.

The return of power politics
The EU now risks being sidelined by Washington and Moscow. Donald Trump’s return to the White House has dramatically reshaped the U.S. stance on Ukraine, with the new administration appearing to prioritise normalisation with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, potentially at the expense of both Kyiv and Brussels.

Under Donald Trump’s foreign policy, the proposed “peace plan” would rest on territorial concessions to Moscow and recognition of a Russian sphere of influence. It would leave Ukraine weakened and dependent, while shifting NATO’s security burden to Europe without granting real decision-making power.

As principles fade into rhetoric and power eclipses values, the European Union must reaffirm its place at the center of global affairs, without giving in to weak or short-term compromises. If Ukraine is the litmus test of Europe’s continental security, the Middle East represents the test of its international credibility.

The Middle East Test
The resurgence of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the scale of the humanitarian crisis have once again challenged Europe to act as a power capable of matching diplomatic resolve with historical responsibility. Yet the Union has remained a secondary actor, effective in reconstruction and cooperation but absent when decisive political choices are made.

The October Sharm el-Sheikh summit revealed the dominance of Donald Trump, who imposed a fragile ceasefire presented as peace. The most critical elements for the region’s stability now lie in the second phase of the peace plan, with many questions still unresolved, including the dismantling of Hamas and the future of Gaza.

Another source of instability stems from Israel’s far-right factions pressing for annexation of the West Bank. This prospect has alarmed Gulf monarchies, whose support is vital to maintaining the ceasefire, and has reignited fears of renewed conflict. Lasting peace will depend on explicit recognition of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination.

The most crucial elements for the region’s geopolitical balance lie in the second phase of the peace plan. Many questions remain open, such as the future dismantling of Hamas and curbing Israel’s right-wing factions.

The Question of Leadership
At the heart of both crises lies the same challenge: European leadership. The EU still lacks a shared political will. Its most decisive weapon is neither military nor economic but political — the capacity to act with unity and purpose.

As Jean Monnet wrote in 1976, “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” The time has come for the Union to decide whether to remain a bystander or to affirm itself as an active and autonomous actor on the world stage.

L'articolo OPINION – Quo vadis, Europe? The EU’s quest for direction amid global turmoil proviene da The Watcher Post.

We have often spoken about how essential it is for the European Union, especially in the age of Trump, to assume a political role capable of inserting itself into this global dynamic and avoiding the overshadowing of Western democracy. Now there is an important opportunity to show that we exist in the world of Trump, Putin, and Xi Jinping.

For years, negotiations have been underway on the trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil). This agreement brings significant economic benefits for the European Union, particularly the increase in exports of pharmaceuticals, automobiles, and machinery, and above all, it would demonstrate that the European Union exists and plays a fundamental geopolitical role in the world.

There have been resistances to this agreement, especially from the agricultural sector and environmentalists. However, in the new text approved by the European Commission, greater guarantees are provided both for agricultural producers and for environmental concerns. The European Commission has committed to adopting a legal act to protect the European agricultural sector, particularly regarding imports of chicken and beef.

To remain divided on this dossier would be fatal and detrimental.

The countries that had shown the greatest reservations, including France, Poland, and Italy, now seem more open thanks to the changes introduced in the new draft agreement. We must ensure that this openness prevails and that a healthy vision of the European Union’s general interests takes precedence over modest concerns that have, for the most part, already been overcome.

L'articolo EU-Mercosur agreement: an opportunity Europe cannot miss proviene da The Watcher Post.

Meanwhile, Ursula von der Leyen, who fears rebellious votes in the European Parliament, especially from the EPP group, is seeking the support of Giorgia Meloni, as evidenced by the unusual delay in publishing the rule of law report. However, Macron and Scholz are strongly opposed to including the Italian prime minister in the majority.

Donald Tusk, the current strongest leader of the EPP, emphasized that the majority should remain composed of the EPP, S&D, and Liberals.

Giorgia Meloni has tried to delay negotiations until July 8, hoping to negotiate from a position of strength after the French elections. However, Macron and Charles Michel brought forward the European Council to June 27/28, putting Meloni in a difficult position. Not voting for the Commission would politically isolate Meloni in Europe.

This situation of uncertainty reflects the three interpretations of the election outcome mentioned by Sergio Fabbrini in Il Sole 24 Ore last Sunday: the first interpretation is that the European right-wing parties emerged victorious, having seen an increase in their members in the new European Parliament; the second is that the victory actually belongs to the pro-European parties that have always governed the Union, as their majority, though weakened, is confirmed; the third is the crisis of the Franco-German axis, driven by individual crises in each of the two countries, with France facing the rise of the anti-system right, which no longer proposes leaving the EU, and Germany facing a sharp electoral division between the west and the east.

How will these difficulties influence the assignment of key roles in European institutions? We will find out in the coming weeks.

L'articolo EU top jobs, European Parties’ chess game proviene da The Watcher Post.

The same cannot be said of many other European countries, where the government forces were defeated by the oppositions, as happened in France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Poland, Slovakia. In Hungary, the coalition led by Fidesz does not achieve an absolute majority. In some cases, the consequences are heavy: from the resignation of Belgian Prime Minister De Croo to the dissolution of the National Assembly in France. In Germany, the CDU has already challenged the hold of the traffic light government, formed by the Socialists – who had the lowest result in their history -, the Greens and the Liberals.

The Ursula majority seems, however, to hold. At the time of writing, the EPP group is expected to increase its membership by eight MEPs and the Socialists and Democrats to lose only two (with the Italian PD expected to be the largest delegation again, as in 2014). Serious losses are being made in the Green (- 19) and Liberal (- 23) houses. The gains of the right-wing groups are, at the moment, smaller, with ECR growing by 4, becoming the fourth largest group in the European Parliament, and ID by 9, placing it just behind in the size ranking. However, there remain 100 elected members whose placement is currently uncertain, which may be unevenly distributed among the various groups.

Outgoing Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has declared victory against all left and right-wing extremism and hopes to retain her position. One must, however, keep an eye on the person who, five years ago, was defeated by the current president in the race for office, namely Manfred Weber, who emerged much stronger from this vote together with his CDU/CSU.

At the level of relations between the new majority and the member states, some unknowns remain, namely what will happen in France and Italy. Should Macron retain the presidency of the Republic in France, pointing to an albeit narrow defeat of RN in the next legislative elections, in Italy it is still uncertain what attitude Fratelli d’Italia will take towards the new European Commission.

L'articolo European elections: Italian voters pay off Forza Italia, PD and the AVS alliance, punishing Lega and centrists proviene da The Watcher Post.

Amidst an ongoing war in the heart of Europe and a dramatically resurging conflict in the Middle East, combined with a declared determination to restore Russian hegemony both territorially and in terms of power, the global situation is tumultuous. We no longer live in the era of a bipolar world, nor can we rely on the naively optimistic promises of the past.

Should Trump return to power in November, the world would have even more reason for concern. We are undoubtedly at a transitional moment: a redefinition of the world order is necessary, which can be shaped in various ways.

The mere thought of an anti-European force victory in June sends shivers down the spine. Personally, I believe this will not happen. Despite the upheavals that have rocked European institutions, I am confident that pro-European forces will prevail and designate the new President of the European Commission, who will enjoy a broad majority both in Parliament and in the Council.

Will this be accomplished by adhering to the nominations of European political families for the Presidency? Or will it occur through an agreement among the leaders in the Council, as suggested by the emerging Franco-German-Polish axis? Alliances are being formed and dissolved at this very moment, but it is crucial to understand: the current context does not allow for superficial maneuvers, and whoever leads the European institutions must bravely and urgently address security and defense issues, judiciously complete the ecological and digital transitions, contribute to a new global framework, and reform internal governance, particularly by overcoming the unanimity voting requirement that stifles democracy.

Furthermore, the new Pellegrini-Orban duo, especially if bolstered by a potential disastrous Trump victory, will not stand idly by.

The Watcher Post EU aims to write about this and much more. Good luck to the entire team on this wonderful adventure!

L'articolo EU analysis and more: a needed new Media proviene da The Watcher Post.

The two most addressed themes by the European Parliament and the Commission have broadly been the green and digital transition. Regarding environmental policies, the most impactful strategy, which has drawn fierce criticism, is the Green New Deal. The Union’s green policies over the last five years have covered various aspects, including climate neutrality, energy policies supporting renewable energies (and in a later phase of the legislature, nuclear energy), the circular economy (consider recycling and reuse initiatives and those aimed at preventing waste), the fight against deforestation, and biodiversity protection.

From a digital perspective, the most significant acts have been the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act. These acts have tackled crucial aspects such as the practices of large tech companies, the promotion of competition, consumer protection, the security of the digital space, the ban on targeted advertising to minors, and content moderation. Towards the end of the legislature, the AI Act was also added, the first international regulation governing the use of artificial intelligence.

This legislature has also seen significant advances in economic governance, as the readers of these articles well know, from the approval of the Next Generation EU to the reform of European budgetary rules. Less significant, however, have been the initiatives for institutional reform, with the Conference on the Future of Europe, whose outcomes are still shrouded in uncertainty, and the failed application of the Spitzenkandidaten system.

In terms of leadership, the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has certainly been more recognized and perceived by European citizens compared to previous commissions. However, the Commission’s image has been blurred by recent scandals, such as Pfizergate and Piepergate. Less positive have been the perceptions of the European Council’s Charles Michel, and the ECB’s Christine Lagarde, both of whom were little appreciated by both insiders and public opinion. However, the figure of David Sassoli will always remain unforgettable.

L'articolo The assessment of the last five years proviene da The Watcher Post.